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Pollutants are classified into two broad categories, local and global, depending on their reach. Local pollutants affect the area in the vicinity of the source of emission.
Global pollutants affect the whole globe. Since the environmental and political stakes are different for the two categories, local and global pollutants are generally regulated separately. In most countries, national regulation of global pollutants, especially greenhouse gases (GHG) has been slow, while local pollution regulation has become increasingly stringent. Regulating local pollution is in the best interest of national and sub-national governments since the costs and benefits are largely borne by and accrue to the same group of people. Moreover, since the reach of local pollution is limited, local pollution regulation can be implemented without international cooperation, making it easier to achieve than GHG regulation.
However, it is possible that the regulation of local pollutants also affects GHG emissions. If there is a reduction in GHG emissions due to local pollutant regulation, termed co-benefits, countries are reducing GHG indirectly as long as they continue to increase the stringency of local pollutant regulation. In this case, even countries that do not commit, or that commit too little, to GHG reductions would still be contributing to limiting global warming. However, if there are no co-benefits, or if local pollution regulation has a perverse effect on GHG, the lack of GHG progress to date is especially worrisome.
In this paper, we investigate whether local air pollution regulations in the United
States have had an effect on GHG emissions. To our knowledge, this is the first study to empirically examine, across all US manufacturing industries, the trade-offs between local and global pollution when local pollution is regulated. Since GHG contribute to climate change, it is important to understand the underlying forces that lead to GHG emission changes. A firm required to lower emissions of local pollutants might respond in one of two ways. On the one hand, if there are spillovers to implementing reductions in local pollutant emissions, local air pollution regulation could be accompanied by a decrease in GHG emissions. Technologies intended to respond to local pollutant regulation could serve to concurrently reduce GHG emissions. For example, switching fuel source from oil to natural gas reduces both local and global pollution. Alternatively, firms might preemptively make all or most of their production processes cleaner if they expect further environmental regulation in the future. If this is the case, passing GHG regulation is less pressing since the regulation of local pollutants is already, at least partly, achieving a reduction in GHG emissions.
On the other hand, we might see an increase in GHG emissions as a result of local pollution regulation if local and global pollutants are substitutable. A firm might replace a production process that is intensive in local pollution with another that is intensive in GHG. For example, natural gas-fired industrial boiler could decrease their combustion temperature to reduce local pollutant emissions, but that leads to an increase in CO 2 emissions (Holland, 2012) . In this case, mandating a decrease in one type of pollution encourages the deterioration of the environment through other, potentially more harmful, pollutants. Finally, there could be no effect of local pollution regulation on GHG emissions if for example a firm abides by the regulation by simply implementing end-of-pipe abatement technologies such as installing scrubbers, which do not affect GHG emissions. If the effect of local air pollution regulation is to increase GHG, or even if the effect is non-existent, global cooperation on GHG emissions should be a top priority.
We use spatial and temporal variation, including exogenous changes in air quality standards under the Clean Air Acts (CAA), to examine GHG emissions in counties that are subject to additional local pollutant regulation. The CAA have caused a dramatic reductions in local pollutant emissions (Chay and Greenstone, 2005; Shapiro and Walker, 2015) . If local and global pollutants are complements, we should observe a similar decrease in GHG emissions across regulated counties. Figure 1 shows the unconditional trends in GHG emissions in counties that satisfy CAA air quality standards as well as in counties that do not meet the standards and therefore have to implement more stringent regulation. The graphs present the log of average firm emissions of GHG, and the vertical line indicates the date of the change in regulation. Regulated counties exhibit higher GHG emissions than unregulated ones, but the evolution over time is very similar across the two groups of counties, suggesting no spillovers from local pollution regulation on GHG emissions.
1 However, these graphs do not control for a number of factors that could conceal the effect of regulation on GHG. For example, the CAA concurrently retarded the level of manufacturing output in regulated counties (Greenstone, 2002) . Moreover, it is not the case that all industries are affected by the regulation, so this aggregate figure could be hiding some important divergences across regulated and unregulated counties for key polluting industries.
Nonetheless, our econometric analysis suggests that the inference drawn from the unconditional graphs is correct: counties that have implemented more stringent regulation as a result of being in non-attainment under the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) do not exhibit GHG emission levels that are different from attainment counties in a systematic way. This conclusion is robust to using both a propensity score matching estimator and various fixed effects regressions which all produce precisely estimated zero effects. Notably, we account for changes to output levels and industrial composition, including the possibility of switching production to unregulated counties, and examine industry-specific patterns to verify that the zeros are not simply on net. Although we recognize that imperfect prox-1 Note that for lead, we do not have pre-implementation data.
ies might introduce some measurement error, in all specifications the results remain that local pollution regulation to date has not had ancillary benefits in terms of GHG reductions in the US manufacturing sector. In light of these conclusions, it is quite possible that efforts by China and others to control local air pollution will not necessarily translate into reductions in contributions to global pollution. In the absence of co-benefits, a world in which countries continue to focus on regulating local pollution while neglecting global pollution regulation will not suffice to address global warming concerns.
In the next section, we examine previous evidence about cross-pollutant substitution and evidence about the local pollutant benefits of greenhouse gas policies. Section 2 presents the new data that we bring to bear on this question. Sections 3 and 4 discuss the two empirical strategies used to estimate the cross-pollutant regulatory effects and the results of those specifications. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
Prior Evidence about Cross-Pollutant Substitution
Understanding the cross-effect of pollution regulation is important for several reasons. The presence of co-benefits can affect the choice of policy instrument to regulate the pollutants. Ambec and Coria (2013) shows that if the pollutants are complements, a mixed policy instrument where one pollutant is taxed and the other subject to a quota might be preferred, while if they are substitutes a pure price or quantity policy dominates. Co-benefits will also affect the scale of regulation to achieve the desired emission reductions. Parry et al. (2014) finds that the nationally efficient price of CO 2 can be quite large in countries with important co-benefits and that pricing those co-benefits reduces total CO 2 emissions significantly (around will yield different optimal abatement levels (Moslener and Requate, 2007) .
However, estimating the co-benefits presents some challenges. The literature examining the potential substitutability or complementarity between local and global pollution takes one of two forms. The first branch studies the local air-quality cobenefits of climate policies. The second, which is the focus of our paper, investigates the opposite direction: the ancillary benefits of local pollution regulation on GHG emissions.
Much of the literature to date focuses on the first channel: how climate policy affects air quality. Nemet et al. (2010) surveys 37 peer-reviewed studies of the modeled airquality co-benefits of climate policies and finds that estimates vary widely, ranging from $2/tCO 2 to $128/tCO 2 in developed countries (see Appendix Table A1) , and up to $196/tCO 2 in developing countries. Some of these studies examine the health and agricultural benefits of climate policies in developing countries (Plantinga and Wu, 2003; Bollen et al., 2009; Bollen, 2009) . Generally, the literature finds that there can be large differences in co-benefits of climate policies across countries, and within countries across sectors (Boyce and Pastor, 2013; Parry et al., 2014) .
Other works focus on the spillovers of climate policy in specific sectors, typically the electricity sector, which represents two thirds of GHG emissions in the United
States. Using an integrated assessment model, Burtraw et al. (2003) explores the ancillary benefits of reduced air pollution in the United States from GHG mitigation policies in the electricity sector. Muller (2012) develops a model of an optimal regulatory program for GHG emissions that accommodates the benefits due to reductions of co-pollutants in the transportation and electric power generation sectors.
Van Harmelen et al. (2002) evaluates the avoided costs of regulating local pollution through climate policy. Beyond the narrow industrial focus which limits the external validity of the results, many of these studies suffer from the fact that industries currently subject to climate policy are also concurrently facing other environmental regulation such as local pollution regulation. In this context, identifying which changes in local pollution can be attributed to climate policy is a difficult task.
On the other hand, the literature on the existence of GHG co-benefits to local pollution regulation is more limited. Holland (2010) posits that due to the symmetry of input substitution, a change in GHG prices should have the same effect on local pollution than a change in local pollution prices would have on GHG emissions.
This would suggest there is no need to study the question in both directions. However, the key issue is whether the measure of regulation accurately embodies the price of emissions or the change in that price. And for most available measures of regulatory stringency, this accuracy is contentious. Some measures do not capture price entirely while others encapsulate the price and much more, reflecting both the complexity of regulation and the challenges to measuring stringency (Brunel and Levinson, 2016) . This implies that the correct magnitude of the GHG emission response to local pollution regulation cannot be inferred from the literature on climate policies' effect on local pollution. Therefore, it requires its own estimation.
In fact, Sigman (1996) examines the co-benefits of air pollution regulation on waste generation and vice-versa using data from the EPA's Toxic Release Inventories in the United States. The evidence suggests that air pollution control regulation reduce waste generation but, conversely, constraints on waste generation increase air emissions, suggesting that air and waste pollution can be complements or substitutes depending on which media is regulated. 2 This potential asymmetry implies that the above studies examining the effects of climate policies on local pollution may not be used to infer the co-benefits of local pollution regulation on GHG.
The most closely related paper to ours, Holland (2012), examines the response of CO 2 emissions to an increase in the stringency of NO x regulation for power plants in California. He begins by presenting a theoretical framework where emissions are an input into the production process. An increase in the price of a pollutant due to more stringent regulation of that pollutant should therefore shift the demand for other inputs, including other pollutants. The shift in demand for other inputs could be either an increase or a decrease depending on whether the input is a substitute or complement. The empirical application uses a fixed effects regression to
show that, following a tightening of NO x regulation under the US Clean Air Act of 1990, almost all of the reduction in CO 2 emissions is due to a decrease in output which reduces both pollutants, rather than a complementarity between CO 2 and NO x .
The focus on the California electricity sector presents an important drawback: the California electricity sector is heavily reliant on natural gas, which is not highly carbon-intensive. Therefore, Holland (2012) cannot capture the substitution from carbon intensive fuels (e.g., coal) to other fuels such as natural gas. Kolstad (2012) thus speculates that the substitution effects might be underestimated in Holland (2012).
In our paper, we change the scope of the analysis to focus on all manufacturing industries. As shown in Table 1 , looking beyond the electricity sector is important because the share of non-electricity sectors in total US GHG emissions has increased from 27% to 34.4% in just five years. Additionally, for some GHG pollutants such as methane and N 2 O, non-electricity sectors represent the vast majority of total emissions. Moreover, unlike the electricity sector, other industries are only subject to one piece of regulation for local air pollution -the US Clean Air Actwhich avoids confounding effects of other regulation, a point we return to in the next section. Finally, we also expand the geographical scope of the paper since we have data on all counties in the United States.
Measuring Environmental Regulatory Stringency and Air Pollution
Our empirical strategy takes advantage of the spatial variation in the stringency of environmental regulation induced by the National Ambient Air Quality Standards, which set minimum air quality standards that each county in the US must meet, and combines this information with a new dataset from the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) on greenhouse gas emissions for industrial facilities.
Local Environmental Stringency
The Clean Air Act requires the EPA to set a minimum and uniform level of ambient air quality for six pollutants in all US counties. These standards, called the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS), are the bar by which every county in the United States is evaluated annually to determine if the county has sufficiently clean air. All counties must attain the same air quality standards, but how they achieve this standard and how difficult it is to reach the threshold varies significantly across counties. Some counties need to impose costly emissions requirements because the composition of their industry is heavy in polluting industries or their geographical location traps air pollution in the county. Others will be able to achieve the standards with little to no effort. A county whose air quality falls below the NAAQS is designated as a "non-attainment" county and will be subject to increased regulatory scrutiny until local emissions are reduced and ambient air quality reaches the threshold or higher.
The NAAQS concern six pollutants, known as "criteria" pollutants: carbon monox-
and sulfur dioxide (SO 2 ). Each year, the EPA makes an official determination of whether each county met each of the standards using air quality monitors and some atmospheric modeling. 3 Non-attainment determination therefore concerns a specific pollutant in a specific year for each county. Once a county is declared to be in non-attainment, the state must design a State Implementation Plan (SIP) that will bring non-attainment counties into compliance with the standard by regulating all major sources of pollution.
The number of counties in non-attainment for each year in our sample for each criteria pollutant standard does not change drastically from year to year suggesting that counties remain in non-attainment for relatively long periods of time (see Appendix Table A3 ). No counties were designated out-of-attainment for CO and NO 2 over our sample period, but the number of non-attainment counties varies across the other pollutants, with the lowest numbers of non-attainment countries for SO 2 and the highest for O 3 .
One advantage to using the NAAQS as a signal of regulatory stringency is that the NAAQS are set by the federal government and apply nationally. They are not caused by or correlated with the economic activity in particular counties, and local governments have little ability to affect non-attainment designations except by reducing pollution. Therefore, the standards represent plausibly exogenous variation in the level of stringency that a particular plant faces. Three pollutants experience a change of standard between 2010 and 2014: O 3 , Pb, and SO 2 (see Appendix Table   A4 ). Although for some pollutants the most recent change dates back to 2008 -prior to the start of our estimation period -the implementation of the rule change occurred after 2010 because of administrative, modeling, and legal delays. Since the rule change occurred a few years before implementation, these changes were highly anticipated and our results might be underestimated.
As states devise their SIPs by focusing on the major emitters, we are interested in the industries that are most likely to be targeted with additional regulatory attention when a county falls into non-attainment for a particular pollutant. We would expect regulators to focus on heavy manufacturing, chemicals, transportation, and other high emitters, while essentially ignoring industries that emit relatively little such as healthcare and other services. Beyond the usual high emitters, some industries pollute heavily in one criteria pollutant but not in others, so an industry regulated in one pollutant will not necessarily be regulated in another. Therefore, we need to identify high emitting industries for each pollutant.
We obtain data on national emissions of criteria pollutants from the 2011 National Emissions Inventory (NEI) for each 4-digit industry of the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) in the United States. We designate an industry as a potential target of regulatory attention if it emits at least 7% of the national total of a particular pollutant. 4 Table 2 displays the industries that are the highest emitters of each criteria pollutant for which we have a regulation change. These comport with intuition: basic chemicals manufacturing, petroleum and coal products manufacturing, and pulp, paper and paperboard mills account for almost 50%
of SO 2 emissions in the United States; oil and gas extraction is a major emitter of O 3 . The portion of reporters that are high emitters and subject to regulation varies significantly across pollutants. Of the nearly 50% of reporters that could be subject to O 3 regulation because they are in high emitting industries, about 13% are in fact regulated because they are located in non-attainment counties (Appendix Table A5 ).
But while approximately one third of reporters could be subject to SO 2 regulation, in practice less than 2% are indeed subject to regulatory scrutiny for SO 2 because very few counties are still in non-attainment for this pollutant. 
Greenhouse gas emissions
We pair this information on local pollutant regulation with a new dataset that contains information on the emission of greenhouse gases. In 2010, the EPA began collecting data for the Greenhouse Gases Reporting Program. This dataset compiles GHG emissions from sources that emit at least 25,000 metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO 2 e) per year. 7 As of 2014, the database covers over 8,000
facilities in 41 industries and is estimated to account for 85-90% of total GHG emissions in the United States (GHGRP Overview Report 2014 , 2015 . Of those, we use data on direct emitters that are not electricity generating units or fossil fuel extraction and transportation, which consist of 3,990 facilities representing 29 percent of direct emissions for 2014. The most polluting industries include: petroleum and coal products manufacturing, chemical manufacturing, primary metal manufacturing, nonmetallic mineral products manufacturing, paper manufacturing, and food manufacturing (see Appendix Table A2 ). Firms are required to report both total GHG emissions in tons of CO 2 e as well as component parts of their emissions for six GHGs such as actual CO 2 , methane, and nitrous oxide.
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In addition to GHG emissions, the Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program collects information about the ownership structure of each reporting facility. This information will allow us to examine how firms' ability to substitute production across facilities subject to differential local pollution regulation influences GHG emissions. 7 The agricultural sector and land use changes are exempt from reporting. 8 The other three gases combined represent less than 1% of emissions.
Other Data
We supplement these data on GHG emissions with information about county industrial composition and demographic information. We obtain data on industrial composition from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The data is classified based on the NAICS.
We aggregate the data at the 2-digit level to obtain total wages and total number of establishments per industry and year for each county. Other controls include population and income per capita data from the United States Census Bureau, as well county-level demographics from the American Community Survey, which averages estimates over 3 years for 2011-2013.
County GHG emissions and local pollutant regulation
Under the NAAQS each county receives an attainment or non-attainment designation for each criteria pollutant. Therefore, if GHG emissions are a complement (substitute) with that local pollutant we would expect aggregate GHG emissions to decrease (increase) with the imposition of additional regulatory stringency. However, GHG emissions are also correlated with other observable characteristics of the counties such as industrial composition that may affect the amount of regulatory stringency in that county. To identify counties that are similar to non-attainment counties except for their NAAQS attainment status, we employ a propensity score estimator.
We create a propensity score (probability of being in non-attainment) for each county and pollutant and use that score to match each non-attainment county (treatment) with an attainment county (control). The propensity score, p(Z), is the probability that treatment occurred given a set of characteristics Z which are relevant for the level of GHG emissions. In our case, Z includes a wide array of demographic and industrial composition variables. P(Z) is therefore a measure of how similar treatment and control groups are beyond the difference in regulatory stringency. The scores are then matched based on the nearest-neighbor strategy: a non-attainment county will be matched with replacement to the attainment county that has the closest propensity score. 9 The matching is done on a cross-section of the year counties were first designated for non-attainment for the new standard, so the year of the matching will be different for each pollutant. Once each treatment county is paired with a control county, we compare the means of the treatment and control groups for the three pollutants for which we observe changes in NAAQS.
To check that treatment and control groups are indeed similar enough that the control group can plausibly represent the counterfactual without regulation, we conduct some balancing tests. Appendix Tables A7 through A9 present the balancing test results for each of the standards when the dependent variable is total GHG and the matching is done on the most comprehensive set of controls variables at the county level: establishments by 2-digit industry, wages by 2-digit industry, population, average income per capita, educational attainment, native-born population, percent of population in the labor force, unemployment rates, poverty rates, median age, racial composition, and lagged GHG levels, as well as the squares of each of these variables.
Beyond the demographic characteristics, establishments and wages measure the 9 Matching with replacement reduces bias, though it may increase variance.
size of each industry. Controlling for the industrial composition of each county serves to differentiate cleaner ambient air quality that is due to economic specialization in less polluting industries, from that due to more intensive or more efficient abatement efforts. Lagged GHG levels further restrict the matches to counties that emit similar levels of GHG in the year prior to the tightening of the local pollution regulation for each standard, so that any difference in GHG levels after the standard tightening can be attributed to the standard change. As can be seen in Appendix Tables A7 through A9 , the mean for treated and control groups are not significantly different across the three pollutants, which constitutes evidence that control counties provide a reasonable counter-factual for our treated counties.
Propensity score matching provides us with some advantages in this context that other estimation methods would not confer. Firstly, propensity score matching allows us to determine attainment counties that are similar in observed attributes to non-attainment counties. This enables us to avoid averaging any treatment effect of being in non-attainment over counties that are drastically different from each other, including counties that are unlikely to ever be in non-attainment or attainment due to their industrial composition.
Additionally, propensity score matching estimators require few distributional assumptions and identify a restricted subsample of control observations that are most similar to the treatment group. However, some treated observations might not have a match. Since we conduct the analysis only on observations where the propensity scores overlap, observations outside of that range are discarded and we lose information. Figure 3 shows that some of our treated observations (green) cannot be matched to a control and are therefore dropped from the estimation. In all cases, these are the observations with the highest propensity scores, i.e. the counties that have the highest likelihood of being in non-attainment. These counties generally have pollution levels so high that they have consistently been in non-attainment since the introduction of the Clean Air Act. These counties cannot reasonably be expected to reduce local pollution levels below the NAAQS standards within the short period we study in this paper. These include for example the Los Angeles
Basin. The question we ask in this paper is whether counties can substitute local for global pollution to abide by NAAQS at the margin, so dropping the counties with propensity scores close to 1 should not affect the estimation. Table 3 columns 1-3 show the matching results using the complete set of matching variables for each pollutant, both for total GHG and for each of the top gases (CO 2 , methane and N 2 O). In all cases, the average treatment effect on the treated is not significantly different from zero. After the local pollution standard change, nonattainment counties emit the same quantities of GHG as attainment counties of the same industrial composition, demographics, and GHG levels prior to the change.
Matching Results
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These results would suggest that a tightening of local pollution regulation has no effect on either total GHG emissions or emissions of CO 2 , methane and N 2 O separately.
Results from a propensity score matching estimation can be sensitive to the set of matching variables (Smith and Todd, 2005) . In the next few columns, we test the robustness of the results to different sets of matching controls. In columns 4-6
we remove the quadratic terms in county demographics, columns 7-9 remove the quadratic terms in industrial composition, and columns 10-12 remove the lagged GHG emissions. In general, the standard errors of the estimates are larger than the estimates themselves suggesting that there is no pattern to changes in county aggregate GHG emissions when a county enters non-attainment. The only significant result appears in column 6 for the effect of a change in lead regulation on total GHG emissions. However, none of the individual GHG components are significant and the estimate is not significant in any of the other specifications, thus we suspect it is likely a spurious correlation.
In case neighboring areas of attainment counties experience spillovers of regulation, we provide additional results assuming that all counties within a certain distance of the treated counties are also treated. Appendix Table A10 presents the results for county centroid distances of 30 and 60 miles, where the 60 mile perimeter generally includes all adjacent counties and some counties that do not directly border the nonattainment county. We observe little change in the results with no estimates being significantly different from zero.
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A few downsides of this strategy are worth mentioning. First, by aggregating all emissions up to the county level, we may be missing important heterogeneity within the county giving us estimates that are not statistically different from zero. Some industries are more likely to be subject to additional regulation from NAAQS than others and these industries may have different GHG emissions from others in the county. Figure 2 , which presents the same graphs as Figure 1 but for industries that account for at least 7% of total emissions, shows that there might be a differential trend between GHG emissions of polluting industries in attainment and non-attainment counties for SO 2 and lead. In the next section we discuss a regression analysis at the industry-level.
Moreover, the matching is done at the county-level. We therefore lose some facilityspecific information and facility-level dynamics in the process. Importantly, aggregating at the county-level prevents us from identifying the output effect: the fact that beyond changing production processes, another way we might observe a decrease in GHG following the implementation of local pollution regulation is if the regulation entices companies to switch the location of production to attainment counties.
If some firms move production to other counties, thereby reducing GHGs, while others substitute local for global pollution which increases GHGs, the combined effect of substitution and output might be nil. Therefore, we turn to the regression analysis which allows more flexibility in the specification.
Facility GHG emissions and local pollutant regulation
In this section we exploit the fact that we have information on facility GHG emissions. Despite the fact that an entire county is designated in non-attainment status, all facilities in the county are not subject to the same additional regulatory scrutiny.
Regulators likely only target the highest emitting facilities since this is where the largest difference can be made to bring the county into attainment. While we do not observe which facilities are subject to increased scrutiny, we use national industrylevel emissions as a proxy for the likelihood that a facility faces local pollutant regulation. Using the 2011 National Emissions Inventory, we determine which industries (4-digit NAICS codes) emit more than 7% of national emissions of that pollutant and use this as a proxy for the likelihood that an industry is subject to additional regulatory scrutiny when the county is in non-attainment.
Using this information, we estimate the effect of the NAAQS on GHG emissions in a similar fashion to Greenstone (2002) where we control for county-level shocks as well as industry-level shocks that may affect facility GHG emissions. There are two main ways through which GHG emissions might change following the tightening of NAAQS: either the firm changes its production processes and GHG emissions will decrease or increase depending on whether GHG and local pollution are complements or substitutes; or the firm changes the location of production from non-attainment to attainment counties. Our regression equation separates those two effects in the following way:
where GHG ijt represent total GHG emissions (CO 2 , methane, and N 2 O) in metric tons of CO 2 e for facility k of industry j in county i at time t.
Vector N A it contains a separate indicator variable for each of the pollutants, where the indicator is equal to 1 if the county is in non-attainment for that pollutant and 0 otherwise. The interactions between non-attainment status and whether the industry is a high emitter that will be the target of regulation (highpoll jt * N A it ) capture variation in GHG specific to polluting plants (relative to non-emitters) in non-attainment counties (relative to attainment counties). Since high-emitting industries are the most likely to be regulated, if local pollution regulation affects GHG emissions β 1 should be significant. This coefficient therefore captures the substitution or complementarity between local and global pollution. A positive and significant β 1 for one of the pollutants would mean that plants regulated for that pollutant in non-attainment counties are increasing GHG emissions, suggesting a substitution between that local pollutant and global pollution. A negative and significant effect, on the other hand, would be indicative of a complementarity between local and global pollution in production. The effect for each pollutant is estimated holding the others constant, which is key since plants might be regulated for more than one of our pollutants (Greenstone, 2002) .
The output effect, on the other hand, is represented by β 2 . The simplest way to switch production from non-attainment to attainment counties would be to relocate production to a different facility owned by the same firm but located in an attainment county. Although this would not affect the overall GHG levels in the United
States, it would change GHG distribution across counties. If we do not control for the ability to switch production across countries, the output effect might be interpreted as a substitution. Ideally, we would like facility-level output, but we do not have that data. Therefore, we construct a variable substitute kt which is a dummy for whether at least one of the parent companies of the facility has other facilities in the dataset within the same 4-digit NAICS code that are located in attainment counties in year t. This variable is interacted with being a high emitter in a nonattainment county. Thus β 2 captures variation in GHG specific to polluting plants (relative to non-emitters) in non-attainment counties (relative to attainment counties) for firms that can switch production across facilities (relative to those who cannot). A positive and significant β 2 would suggest that firms with facilities producing polluting goods in non-attainment counties are indeed switching production towards facilities in unregulated attainment counties.
The vector X ijt consists of control variables: number of establishments, annual average of monthly employment levels, and total annual wages by county and year, as well as for each facility the number of owners and of other production facilities the parent firm has in the same NAICS code. The first three variables control for the industrial composition of the county. The latter two controls are needed in case firms change their ownership structure as a result of regulation. A firm could for example purchase a facility in an attainment county, or merge with another firm that already has production facilities in attainment counties in order to transfer production.
The regression also includes industry-by-year fixed effects, county-by-year fixed effects, and facility fixed effects. 13 The industry-by-year fixed effects allow us to purge the estimates of unobservables that affect an entire industry, while the countyby-year fixed effects all us to purge the estimates of emissions changes that are common to highly-polluting and non-highly-polluting industries within a county.
The facility fixed effects absorb facility characteristics that do not change over our sample period. These fixed effects mean that our estimates are identified by within county-year variation in GHG emissions across highly-polluting and non-highlypolluting industries and within industry-year variation across attainment and nonattainment counties.
The facility fixed effects reduce the degrees of freedom but they are essential to this regression since our datasets do not include any plant-specific characteristics.
If non-attainment counties are more attractive to polluting plants and industries because of the presence of a natural resource or skilled workforce or simply contain larger production facilities, then non-attainment status would be correlated with systematic differences across plants. The facility fixed effects guarantee that the parameters of interest are identified from within-plant comparisons facing a change in regulation.
13 All clean industries are combined into one group, while each polluting industry is on its own. Table 4 shows the regression results. First and foremost, the striking conclusion is there does not appear to be any significant effect of local regulation on GHG emissions. This result is robust to including various controls and fixed effects, and holds whether the dependent variable is total GHG emissions or individual GHGs.
In column (1), we present the results of a simple equation relating the effect of being a high emitter in a non-attainment county to GHG emissions using all plants over the five years and including all sets of fixed effects. The next two columns correspond to specifications that include additional controls. Column (2) adds the number of establishments, annual average of monthly employment levels, and total annual wages by industry to account for industrial composition. Column (3) includes all controls in column (2) and the output effect, i.e. the interactions between being a high-emitter in a non-attainment county and having facilities in attainment counties where production can relocate. The coefficients on the first four variables are now the effect of regulation purged of the output effect, i.e. they represent the substitution effect alone. That effect is still indistinguishable from zero and nearly all of the point estimates are extremely close to zero.
The specifications in columns (4) and (5) add the number of owners for each facility and the number of other production facilities the parent firm has in the same 4-digit NAICS code. Ownership structure does not appear to have a significant effect on emissions. Columns (6) and (7) present the same specification as column (3) but with different sets of fixed effects: county, year, and facility for column (6), and county, year, industry, and facility for column (7). All of these specifications show the same general pattern that there is no effect of local pollutant regulation on greenhouse gas emissions regardless of the control variables included or the type of fixed effects. The specification in column (7) has two marginally significant coefficients on both of the ozone variables. The sum of these coefficients suggest that facilities owned by firms that can switch production do not change total greenhouse gas emissions. Still, there may be a complementarity effect on facilities that cannot switch production. However, the significance appears spurious and disappears with a more complete set of fixed effects.
In order to isolate the effect of local pollution regulation on greenhouse gas emissions without confounding this with the ability of firms to reallocate production across facilities, we examine only firms that have all of their facilities in nonattainment counties. While these firms are likely to be smaller than the average firm since many of them only have a single facility, they provide us with an estimate of the total effect of local pollutant regulation on greenhouse gas emissions. Column (8) displays the results of our preferred specification (column (3)) estimated on this sample. The coefficients are still not statistically significant, though the standard errors are higher due to the lower number of observations.
Up to this point, our analysis has focused on total GHG emissions and have not found systematic evidence of an effect of local pollution regulation on GHG emissions. However, there may be substitutability between local pollution and a specific type of GHG. Table 5 shows that even when we separate GHG into CO 2 , methane, and N 2 O, for our preferred specification (equivalent to column (3) in the previous tables), we still do not observe any effect. Table 6 provides a series of robustness checks. Since polluting activities tend to be concentrated in urban areas, urban firms will be more severely impacted by regulation than rural firms, and their options for dealing with the regulation might be different. Urban firms, however, do not change their GHG emissions in response to local pollution regulation (column (1)). However, we see a decrease in GHG emissions for rural facilities in non-attainment counties (column (2)). 14 This is suggestive that for some firms ozone and GHG emissions may be complements; however this specification is asking a lot of the data since only 3% of facilities are in rural counties that are also in non-attainment for the ozone standard.
In addition to examining differential effects from urban and rural facilities, we consider the possibility that firms near attainment areas might be affected by the regulation even through they are not in a non-attainment county. Since states write an implementation plan to bring counties into compliance, it is possible that facilities in other counties within the same state are also subject to more stringent regulation in order to bring a neighboring county into attainment. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 6 display similar regression results where counties within 30 and 60 miles of non-attainment counties in the same state are also assumed to be subject to more stringent environmental regulation. Our results are not qualitatively different suggesting that we haven't diluted the treatment effect by including in our control group facilities located in attainment counties that are actually subject to additional regulation.
We further investigate if our estimates are averaging positive and negative effects across industries leading to a nil effect on average. It could be that some polluting industries are substituting local for global pollution, while others are decreasing all emissions, and yet others switch production to facilities in unregulated counties.
Appendix Table A11 suggests that this is not the case. The lack of effect of local pollution regulation on GHG is persistent through each of the highly polluting 14 We identify urban and rural areas using the US Department of Agriculture's 2013 RuralUrban Continuum codes, available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/ rural-urban-continuum-codes.aspx.
industries (columns (1) through (8)) as well as for the group of industries that are regulated for at least one pollutant (column (9)).
Finally, we present results using a different cutoff for what is considered a highemitting industry: 5% of total emissions rather than 7%. Appendix Table A12 indicates which industries are considered high emitters under this new threshold. Compared to Table 2 , the following industries are added: cement and concrete product manufacturing, coal mining, nonmetallic mineral mining and quarrying, and sugar and confectionery product manufacturing. The regression results are qualitatively unchanged: there are some spurious significant coefficients mostly when the output effect is not controlled for, but our preferred specifications clearly show that local pollution regulations do not affect the level of GHG (Appendix Table A13 ).
In sum, we do not find evidence of either a substitutability or a complementarity between local and global pollution in production. We attempt to control as best we can given data constraints for other channels which could lead to an effect on emissions such as output decreasing, or the composition of production changing, including due to the production of polluting goods moving to unregulated counties. We also examine industry-specific results to check that the zero effect is not a net of some industries substituting while others treat local and global pollutants as complements. None of these options appear to be verified. Instead, we observe a persistent zero effect suggesting that regulating local pollution has not had an effect on national GHG emission levels of US manufacturing industries.
While many countries have made great strides in limiting environmental damages from local pollutants such as sulfur dioxide, ground-level ozone, and lead through increasing regulatory stringency, there has been relatively little direct regulation of greenhouse gases which have global consequences. Since the costs of local pollutant regulation are largely borne by the population of the country where benefits accrue, whereas the benefits of global pollutant regulation are spread more diffusely, it is likely that local pollutant regulation will continue to increase in stringency whereas it is less clear what meaningful efforts will be made to reduce GHG emissions.
In this paper, we explore whether local pollution regulation contribute to achieving reduction in GHG emissions due to a complementarity between local and global pollutants. Our results suggests that in the United States, increased stringency of local pollution regulation has not resulted in a statistically detectible concurrent decrease in GHG emissions for manufacturing industries. This result is robust to many specifications and different estimation methods. It cannot be explained by a decrease in production or by firms switching production to unregulated countries, and it is true on aggregate as well as for individual polluting industries. The good news is we do not either find that current local pollution regulation have had a perverse effect on GHG emission by substituting local for global pollution. Since current progress to control local pollution has not had ancillary benefits in terms of GHG reductions, action needs to be taken to directly address global pollutants rather than relying on local pollutant regulation. Column (8) restricts the sample to only facilities at which owners do not own another facility in an attainment county. All standard errors are clustered at the county-level. 
